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Abstract 
Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous 
contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created 
by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New 
Hampshire Effect, we find that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) 
expenditure than simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is 
significant over-expenditure in all battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as 
two complementary explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence. 
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1. Introduction 
The nomination process for the U.S. presidential election consists of a series of nationwide 
primary elections, beginning with the New Hampshire primary. The significance of this small New 
England state became entrenched in the quadrennial election politics in 1952, when Estes Kefauver 
defeated the incumbent President Harry Truman in the primary, leading Truman to abandon his 
campaign. In 1988, all but one of George Bush’s Republican opponents withdrew soon after the 
primary, and in 1992, number of Democratic Party candidates dwindled from five to two after the 
primary (Busch and Mayer, 2004).1 Controlling for other factors, Mayer (2004) finds that a win in 
the New Hampshire primary increases a candidate’s expected share of total primary votes by a 
remarkable 26.6 percent.2 
The perception that New Hampshire plays a pivotal and perhaps a disproportionately large 
role in the presidential election (and thereby derives a wide array of political and economic benefits 
from that position) led many states to move up the date of their primaries.3 ‘Frontloading’ is the 
name given to a recent trend in the presidential nomination process in which more and more states 
schedule their primaries near the beginning of the delegate selection process. Clustering of 
primaries took a huge leap forward in 1988 with the formation of ‘Super Tuesday’ when 16 states 
held their primaries on a single day in March. By 2008, 24 states held their primary on Super 
                                                 
1 Just as candidates who do poorly in the New Hampshire primary frequently drop out, the lesser-known, underfunded 
candidates who do well in the primary suddenly become serious contenders to win the party nomination, garnering 
tremendous momentum both in terms of media coverage and campaign funding. In 1992, Bill Clinton, a little known 
governor of Arkansas did surprising well, and was labeled the “Comeback Kid” by the national media. In 2000, John 
McCain emerged as George Bush’s principal challenger only after an upset victory in New Hampshire, and a similar 
comeback was made by John Kerry in the 2004 primary. 
2 In a multi-candidate race, even a second-place finish in New Hampshire primary increases a candidate’s final vote 
by 17.2 percent (Mayer, 2004). 
3 The total economic impact of 2000 primary on New Hampshire’s economy was estimated to be $264 million. The 
state also receives a diverse array of ‘special policy concessions’ as a result of its privileged position in the presidential 
nomination process (Busch and Mayer, 2004). Originally held in March, the date of the New Hampshire primary has 
been moved up repeatedly to maintain its status as first (a tradition since 1920). In fact, the state law requires that its 
primary must be the first in the nation. 
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Tuesday held in the first week of February. In 2004, James Roosevelt, co-chair of the Democratic 
Party Rules Committee proclaimed: “We are moving towards a de facto national primary.” 
For obvious reasons, with naturally-occurring data, it is difficult to examine the exact 
impact of the two alternative electoral structures on both election outcomes and their economic 
efficiency. For this reason, we use a controlled laboratory experiment to compare a sequential 
contest, such as the current presidential primaries, to a simultaneous contest, as reflected in a 
counterfactual national primary.4 Our theoretical framework is based on Klumpp and Polborn 
(2006). In this political contest model, candidates have to win the majority of electoral districts in 
order to obtain a prize – the party nomination. As in Tullock (1980) and Snyder (1989), candidates 
can influence the probability of winning an electoral district by their choice of campaign 
expenditure in that district. In case of a sequential contest, theory predicts that candidates should 
spend disproportionately larger amounts in the earlier districts than in the later districts. This 
difference in expenditure is attributed to the “New Hampshire Effect.” That is, the outcome of the 
first election creates asymmetry between ex-ante symmetric candidates in terms of their incentive 
to spend resources in the next district, which in turn, endogenously increases the probability that 
the winner of the first district will win in subsequent districts and attain the final prize. For 
example, in a sequential contest with three districts (battles), the winner of the first battle wins the 
overall contest with probability of 0.875. Furthermore, the intense concentration of expenditure in 
the initial battles entails that there is a 0.75 probability that the contest will end in only two battles. 
In contrast, in case of a simultaneous contest, candidates are predicted to spend equal amounts of 
                                                 
4 Our experiment compares two extreme benchmarks: a completely sequential contest to a completely simultaneous 
contest. Present day primary system, however, has a mixed temporal structure. The nomination process starts with a 
series of sequential elections held in various states (Iowa caucus, New Hampshire primary, etc.) followed by days 
such as “Super Tuesday.” Klumpp and Polborn (2006) state that the results of a completely sequential contest can 
apply to a mixed temporal contest, as long as the latter begins with at least a few sequential battles. 
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resources in all three battles. An important consequence of this temporal difference in contest 
design is that the sequential contest is predicted to induce lower expenditure than the simultaneous 
contest, which potentially could explain why political parties may choose the sequential electoral 
structure of the primaries in order to minimize wasteful campaign expenditure.5 
Our laboratory study of the three-battle contests provides evidence for the New Hampshire 
Effect. We find that the strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle makes it more 
likely for him to win the entire contest. However, contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find 
that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) expenditure than simultaneous 
contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-expenditure in all 
three battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as two complementary 
explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence.  
Analogies between our laboratory environment and the naturally-occurring political 
contests are imperfect. Our design choices were made to facilitate analytical tractability and sharp 
experimental investigation, and do not capture all the details of the real-world elections. For 
instance, we assume that both contestants are symmetric and do not account for factors such as 
name recognition, time of announcing candidacy, information aggregation, or the nature of 
campaigns. We also ignore the carryover effect of winning (Schmitt et al., 2004), bandwagon effect 
                                                 
5 The contest model is complementary to the voters’ participation model (Morton and Williams, 1999; Battaglini et 
al., 2007). In the voters’ participation model the probability of winning an electoral district by a candidate depends on 
the number of votes received, while in the contest model such a probability depends on the relative campaign 
expenditure by each candidate in that district. The complementarity between the two models arises because one of the 
reasons for the New Hampshire Effect that is commonly discussed in political science is information aggregation, 
which is implicit in voting models. For instance, Morton and Williams (1999) compare sequential and simultaneous 
voting and find that in sequential voting later voters use early outcomes to infer information about asymmetric 
candidates, and thus make better informed choices that reflect their true preferences. Battaglini et al. (2007) find that 
sequential voting aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information 
environments, but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs. By assuming 
that both candidates are symmetric and by abstracting from costly voter participation decision, we are able to isolate 
how candidates’ relative expenditure alone determines the likelihood of winning current and future electoral districts. 
That is, we examine the New Hampshire Effect resulting solely from candidates’ campaign expenditure decisions. 
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(Callander, 2007) and the conditional promise of additional funding upon winning the primary 
(Feigenbaum and Shelton, 2013). However, at least some of these factors do not detract from our 
findings. For instance, theory predicts that the New Hampshire Effect holds even if players are 
asymmetric in the sense that one is a better campaigner or has assured win in certain districts 
(Klumpp and Polborn, 2006). In fact, the exogenous ex-ante asymmetry is further strengthened in 
sequential contests by the endogenous ex-post asymmetry. Similarly, bandwagon theory and 
carryover effect provide additional rationale for momentum to shift forward to earlier battles, 
thereby reinforcing our results. Finally, sequential and simultaneous contests are not just restricted 
to political contests, and can in fact be employed to study resource allocation problems in military 
and systems defense (Clark and Konrad, 2007), research and development portfolio selection 
(Clark and Konrad, 2008), and advertising (Friedman, 1958). By contrasting sequential and 
simultaneous multi-battle contests in the simplest possible framework using laboratory data, which 
is untainted from the various complicating factors that plague naturally-occurring data, we provide 
a direct empirical test of the theoretical model of primary elections by Klumpp and Polborn (2006).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the 
multi-battle contest literature, both theoretical and experimental. Section 3 presents our theoretical 
framework and Section 4 describes the experimental design, procedures and hypotheses. Section 
5 reports the results of our experiment and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The theoretical literature on multi-battle contests originated with seminal work by 
Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Snyder (1989).6 Fudenberg et al. (1983) model R&D competition as 
                                                 
6 One could also argue that the original formulation of a Colonel Blotto game by Borel (1921) is a starting point of 
the multi-battle contest literature. 
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a sequential multi-battle contest, while Snyder (1989) models political campaigning as a 
simultaneous multi-battle contest.7 For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on 
multi-battle contests see Kovenock and Roberson (2012). Klumpp and Polborn (2006) directly 
compare sequential and simultaneous multi-battle contests in a context of primary elections. They 
show that the sequential contest creates a strategic advantage for the winner of the first battle, the 
result they call a “New Hampshire Effect,” thus minimizing potentially wasteful expenditure in 
future battles. 
We conduct an experiment to test the predictions of the theoretical model by Klumpp and 
Polborn (2006). While most of the existing experimental studies focus on single-battle contests, 
recently there has been an increased interest in examining multi-battle contests (Avrahami and 
Kareev, 2009; Arad and Rubinstein, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2013; Mago and Sheremeta, 2017). 
For a comprehensive review of this literature see Dechenaux et al. (2015). Experimental studies 
on simultaneous multi-battle contests have examined how asymmetry in resources (Avrahami and 
Kareev, 2009; Arad, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2013), asymmetry in objectives (Kovenock et al., 
2010; Duffy and Matros, 2015; Holt et al., 2016; Montero et al., 2016), and asymmetry in battles 
(Horta-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2010; Avrahami et al., 2014) impact behavior in contests. 
Experimental studies on sequential multi-battle contests have examined the impact of contest 
structure (Deck and Sheremeta, 2012), carryover (Schmitt et al., 2004), fatigue (Ryvkin, 2011), 
the length of the contest (Zizzo, 2002; Deck and Sheremeta, 2016), intermediate prizes and luck 
(Mago et al., 2013; Gelder and Kovenock, 2017) on behavior in dynamic contests.8 Most of these 
                                                 
7 Building on these models, subsequent papers investigated the ramification of various factors such as the sequence 
ordering of decisions, number of battles, asymmetry between players, effect of carryover, effect of uncertainty, the 
impact of discount factor and intermediate prizes (Harris and Vickers, 1985, 1987; Leininger, 1991; Baik and Lee, 
2000; Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003; Roberson, 2006; Kvasov, 2007; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009). 
8 Related to the studies on sequential multi-battle contests are the studies examining multi-battle elimination contests 
(Parco et al., 2005; Amegashie et al., 2007; Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b; Altmann et al., 2012; Höchtl et al., 2015). 
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studies find support for the comparative statics predictions (see the review by Dechenaux et al., 
2015), but often report significant over-expenditure of resources (also known as overbidding or 
over-dissipation) relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction (see the reviews by Sheremeta, 2013, 
2015). 
Our study compares sequential and simultaneous multi-battle contests. Consistent with the 
previous studies, we find significant over-expenditure relatively to the Nash equilibrium in both 
contests. Our most surprising result is the reversal of the comparative statics prediction of Klumpp 
and Polborn (2006) – we find that contrary to prediction, the sequential contest generates higher 
expenditure than the simultaneous contest. This is surprising because, as mentioned above, almost 
all contest experiments in the literature find strong support for the comparative statics predictions 
even if the precise quantitative predictions are refuted. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of 
winning as possible explanations for this finding. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
Consider two risk-neutral and equally-skilled players, 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌, competing in a multi-battle 
contest for an exogenously determined and commonly known prize v. There are 𝑛𝑛 battles in the 
contest. Let 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denote the amount of resource expenditure by players 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 in battle 𝑖𝑖. 
Following Tullock (1980), the probabilities of winning battle 𝑖𝑖 by players 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 are defined by 
a “lottery” contest success functions, such that a player’s probability of winning the battle depends 
on his expenditure relative to the total expenditure: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖    and    𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖     (1) 
The player who wins a majority of the battles, i.e., at least (𝑛𝑛 + 1)/2 battles, wins the 
overall contest and receives the prize 𝑣𝑣. Therefore, the net payoff of player 𝑋𝑋 (similarly for player 
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𝑌𝑌) is equal to the value of the prize if he wins (zero otherwise) minus the total expenditure he has 
spent during the contest: 
𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋 = �𝑣𝑣 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1      if 𝑋𝑋 wins the contest−∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1         otherwise                       (2) 
The battles in the contest can proceed in two ways: sequentially or simultaneously. We 
describe the theoretical predictions for both these cases with 𝑛𝑛 = 3, although all the comparative 
statics predictions hold for any 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 3 (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006). We chose 𝑛𝑛 = 3 to simplify 
the experimental environment and to facilitate greater subject comprehension. 
 
3.1. Sequential Multi-Battle Contest 
In the sequential multi-battle contest, players simultaneously choose expenditure levels 𝑥𝑥1 
and 𝑦𝑦1 in battle 1. After determining the winner of battle 1, they move to battle 2 where they choose 
expenditures 𝑥𝑥2 and 𝑦𝑦2. Players continue to compete until one player accumulates two victories. 
The solution concept we consider is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Using backward 
induction, we begin our examination with the final and decisive battle 3. Note that if one of the 
players has already won the previous two battles there is no need to compete in battle 3 and thus 
expenditures are 𝑥𝑥3∗ = 𝑦𝑦3∗ = 0. However, if each player has won one of previous two battles then 
the winner of the contest is determined by the result of battle 3. In such a case, player 𝑋𝑋’s expected 
payoff (similarly for player 𝑌𝑌) is equal to the probability of player 𝑋𝑋 winning battle 3 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋3(𝑥𝑥3,𝑦𝑦3) 
times the prize valuation 𝑣𝑣 minus cost of expenditure 𝑥𝑥3: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋3) = 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋3(𝑥𝑥3,𝑦𝑦3)𝑣𝑣 − 𝑥𝑥3 = 𝑥𝑥3𝑥𝑥3+𝑦𝑦3 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑥𝑥3     (3) 
In the Nash equilibrium, battle 3 expenditures are 𝑥𝑥3∗ = 𝑦𝑦3∗ = 𝑣𝑣/4 and the expected payoffs 
are 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋3) = 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌3) = 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋3) = 𝑣𝑣/4. Going backwards to battle 2, suppose player 𝑋𝑋 won 
9 
 
battle 1 and is leading the contest. Therefore, players are necessarily asymmetric, wherein player 
𝑋𝑋 needs to win only one more battle to win the contest, while player 𝑌𝑌 needs to win two battles. 
In this case, players 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 have the following expected payoffs:  
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋2) = 𝑥𝑥2𝑥𝑥2+𝑦𝑦2 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑥𝑥2+𝑦𝑦2 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋3) − 𝑥𝑥2    and    𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌2) = 𝑦𝑦2𝑥𝑥2+𝑦𝑦2 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋3) − 𝑦𝑦2 (4) 
Note that player 𝑋𝑋’s value of winning battle 2 is higher than that of player 𝑌𝑌. Consequently, 
in battle 2 player 𝑋𝑋 chooses higher expenditure than player 𝑌𝑌, and is more likely to win the overall 
contest. Klumpp and Polborn (2006) call this outcome the “New Hampshire Effect” – the outcome 
of battle 1 has an asymmetric effect on expenditures of ex-ante symmetric players. In the Nash 
equilibrium, battle 2 expenditures are 𝑥𝑥2∗ = 9𝑣𝑣/64 and 𝑦𝑦2∗ = 3𝑣𝑣/64 and the expected payoffs are 
𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋2) = 43𝑣𝑣/64 and 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌2) = 𝑣𝑣/64. Finally, going back to battle 1, the players are symmetric 
again. Both players need to accumulate two battle victories to win the contest. In this case, player 
𝑋𝑋 (similarly, player 𝑌𝑌) maximizes the following expected payoff: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋1) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥1+𝑦𝑦1 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋2) + 𝑦𝑦1𝑥𝑥1+𝑦𝑦1 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌2)  − 𝑥𝑥1     (5) 
In the Nash equilibrium of this subgame, battle 1 expenditures are 𝑥𝑥1∗ = 𝑦𝑦1∗ = 21𝑣𝑣/128 and 
the expected payoffs are 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋1) = 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌1) = 𝐸𝐸∗(𝜋𝜋1) = 23𝑣𝑣/128. Both players have the same 
expenditure profile because they have the same value for winning battle 1. Aggregating across all 
three battles, the expected equilibrium expenditure by each player is 41𝑣𝑣/128. 
 
3.2. Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contest 
In the simultaneous multi-battle contest, players simultaneously choose expenditure levels 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 for all three battles 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. Then, the winner of each individual battle is determined 
and the player who wins at least two battles wins the overall contest and obtains the prize. Note 
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that each battle of the multi-battle contest is an ‘independent’ lottery contest. Therefore, player 𝑋𝑋 
(similarly, player 𝑌𝑌) maximizes the following expected payoff: 
 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋) = ��33� � 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥+𝑦𝑦�3 +  �32� � 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥+𝑦𝑦�2 � 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥+𝑦𝑦�� 𝑣𝑣 − 3𝑥𝑥 = �� 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥+𝑦𝑦�3 + 3𝑥𝑥2𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥+𝑦𝑦)3� 𝑣𝑣 − 3𝑥𝑥 (6) 
In the unique Nash equilibrium, both players make the same expenditure in all battles, i.e., 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑣𝑣/8 for all 𝑖𝑖.9 Aggregating across all three battles, the expected equilibrium 
expenditure by each player is 48𝑣𝑣/128. 
 
4. Experimental Environment 
4.1. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
We employ two treatments: sequential and simultaneous. In the sequential treatment two 
players compete in a sequential multi-battle contest, while in the simultaneous treatment two 
players compete in a simultaneous multi-battle contest. Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium 
predictions in both treatments for 𝑣𝑣 = 100 and 𝑛𝑛 = 3. These predictions motivate the following 
three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Total expected expenditure in the sequential contest is lower compared to 
the simultaneous contest. 
The expected total expenditure by a player in the sequential contest is 32.4, and in the 
simultaneous contest is 37.5. 
Hypothesis 2: In the sequential contest, the winner of battle 1 is more likely to win battle 
2 and the overall contest. 
                                                 
9 The solution to this game can be found in Friedman (1958). 
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In the sequential contest, the outcome of battle 1 creates asymmetry between ex-ante 
symmetric players. This asymmetry endogenously triggers differing expenditure levels in the 
subsequent battles and generates momentum for the winner of battle 1, also known as the “New 
Hampshire Effect.” Since it is less likely for the loser of battle 1 to win the contest, the absolute 
level of expenditure falls sharply after the outcome of battle 1 is known. In battle 2, the winner of 
battle 1 exerts three times more expenditure than the loser. As a result, sequential contest ends 
after two battles with probability 0.75, and the winner of battle 1 wins the overall contest with 
probability 0.875. 
Hypothesis 3: In the simultaneous contest, expenditures are uniformly distributed across 
all three battles. 
Since all three battles are identical in the simultaneous contest, both players make the same 
expenditure of 12.5 in each battle. This is in sharp contrast to the sequential contest where 
expenditures are predicted to be more intensely concentrated in the first battle.10 
 
4.2. Experimental Procedures 
A total of 144 subjects participated in 12 sessions (12 subjects per session). All subjects 
were undergraduate students at Chapman University and inexperienced in this decision-making 
environment.11 No one participated in more than one session. The experimental sessions were run 
using computer software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Throughout the session, no communication 
between subjects was permitted, and all choices and information were transmitted via computer 
                                                 
10 In the sequential contest, the total expected expenditure by both players in battle 1 is 32.8; in battle 2 is 18.8; and 
since battle 3 is likely to occur with probability 0.25, the unconditional expected expenditure in battle 3 is 25. 
11 48% of our subjects identified as males and 52% as females. The average age of the participants was 19.63 and 
ranged between 18 and 28. More than 60% of the subjects were sophomores or freshmen and about 70% were majoring 
in business and economics. 
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terminals. At the beginning of each session, subjects received an initial endowment of $20 to cover 
any potential losses. 
Each experimental session corresponded to 20 periods of play in one of the two treatments. 
Thus, 6 sessions featured the sequential treatment and 6 sessions featured the simultaneous 
treatment, generating a total of 1440 observations for each treatment (6 sessions × 12 subjects × 
20 periods). Subjects were given the instructions, available in the Appendix A, at the beginning of 
the experiment, and these were read aloud by the experimenter. Before the start of the experiment, 
subjects completed a computerized multiple choice quiz to verify their understanding of the 
instructions.12 The experiment started only after all subjects completed the quiz and explanations 
were provided for any incorrect answers. In every period, subjects were randomly and 
anonymously placed into 6 groups with 2 players in each group. To keep the terminology neutral, 
in the instructions we describe the task as one of making bids in boxes and the player who wins 2 
boxes gets the prize of 100 experimental francs. We gave detailed explanations and numerical 
examples for the mechanisms underlying the contest structures, and how winners are determined 
in each battle (i.e., the lottery rule). Subjects were informed that increasing their bid would increase 
their chance of winning; and that regardless of who wins the prize, all subjects would have to pay 
their bids. In the simultaneous treatment subjects were asked to make bids in three battles 
simultaneously. They were not allowed to bid more than 100 francs in any battle and money spent 
on bidding was subtracted from the initial endowment of $20.13 After subjects submitted their bids, 
                                                 
12 Subjects also made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002), at the beginning of the 
experiment. These were used to elicit their risk aversion preferences, and subjects were paid for one randomly selected 
choice. We did not find any interesting patterns or correlations between risk attitudes and behavior in contests. So, we 
omit any discussion from the article. 
13 100 francs is substantially higher than the highest possible equilibrium bid, but we decided not to constrain 
individual bidding to be consistent with the theoretical model which assumes no budget constraints. Additionally, we 
wanted to avoid potential unintended behavioral consequences since enforcing even non-binding budget constraints 
can unexpectedly affect subjects’ behavior (Price and Sheremeta, 2011; Sheremeta, 2011). 
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the computer displayed own bids, opponent’s bids, the winner of each battle, the overall winner 
and own final payoff. In the sequential treatment subjects made their bidding decision sequentially, 
either in two or three rounds (with bids not exceeding 100 francs in any round). At the end of each 
round, the computer displayed own bid, opponent’s bid, and the winner of the battle in that round. 
The period ended when one of the subjects in the group won two rounds. At the end of each period, 
subjects were randomly re-grouped to form a new two-person group.  
At the end of the experiment, 2 out of 20 periods were randomly selected for payment.14 
The sum of the earnings for these 2 periods was exchanged at rate of 25 experimental francs = US 
$1. On average, the experimental sessions lasted for about 60 minutes, and subjects earned $21 
which was paid anonymously and in cash.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. General Results 
Table 2 presents the mean expenditure and payoff in both sequential and simultaneous 
contests. The average total expenditure is 56.0 in the sequential contest and 40.3 in the 
simultaneous contest. While the observed expenditure in the simultaneous contest is not 
significantly different from the equilibrium predictions (40.3 versus 37.5; Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p-value = 0.24, n = 6), the observed expenditure in the sequential contest is significantly 
higher than predicted (56.0 versus 32.0; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.02, n = 6). We 
also corroborate the conclusions from these conservative nonparametric tests by estimating 
multivariate panel regression models.15 
                                                 
14 We chose to select only 2 periods for payment in order to avoid intra-experimental income effects (McKee, 1989). 
In addition, subjects were paid for their lottery choice from the risk elicitation procedure. 
15 We have checked the robustness of these results by estimating a mixed-effects panel model for each treatment (see 
Table B1 in Appendix B). We have 1440 observations for each treatment (6 sessions × 12 subjects × 20 periods). The 
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Over-expenditure in contests is a commonly observed phenomenon (Sheremeta, 2013, 
2015; Dechenaux et al., 2015), and therefore, the result that total expenditure in the simultaneous 
contest conforms to the theoretical predictions may seem surprising. However, as we discuss later, 
instead of following the equilibrium strategy of allocating their resources to all three battles, 
subjects use the incomplete coverage strategy by focusing their expenditure on just two battles. 
Expenditure in these two battles average at 16.3, which exceeds the equilibrium prediction of 12.5. 
Therefore, one could speculate that we would also observe over-expenditure in the simultaneous 
multi-battle contest if subjects did not use a non-equilibrium strategy of incomplete coverage of 
battles. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.3. 
The experiment lasted for 20 periods and it is relevant to examine how expenditure evolves 
over the length of the experiment. Figures 1 and 2 show that expenditure decreases over time in 
the sequential and simultaneous contests. In the sequential contest, the average total expenditure 
drops from 62.9 in the first half of the experiment to 49.0 in the second half. In the simultaneous 
contest, it drops from 42.9 in the first half to 37.8 in the second half. Panel regressions confirm 
that these declines are statistically significant (p-values < 0.01).16 Overall, our result that over-
expenditure decreases with repetition in the direction of equilibrium play is consistent with 
previous experimental findings on single-battle contests (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Sheremeta and 
Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Mago et al., 2016). 
                                                 
dependent variable in the regression is the total expenditure and the independent variables are a constant and a period 
trend. The model included a mixed-effects error structure with a 3-way nested model (observations nested within a 
session and then within a subject) to account for the multiple decisions made by each subject and random re-matching 
within a session. A standard Wald test, conducted on estimates of regression models, shows that expenditure in the 
sequential contest is significantly higher than predicted (p-value < 0.01) and for the simultaneous contest it is not 
different from the prediction (p-value = 0.60). Hypothesis testing with a few clusters (sessions) can result in over-
rejection of the null hypothesis. To address this concern, we also conducted regressions based on Cameron et al. (2008) 
wild cluster approach. The results remain the same – expenditure in the sequential contest is significantly higher than 
predicted and for the simultaneous contest it is not different from the prediction. 
16 See Table B1 in Appendix B. 
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A comparison across the two treatments informs our Hypothesis 1 that the average total 
expenditure is lower in the sequential contest relative to the simultaneous contest (32.0 versus 
37.5). Contrary to this prediction, however, we find that the average total expenditure in the 
sequential contest is higher than in the simultaneous contest (56.0 versus 40.3; Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p-value = 0.01, n1 = 6, n2 = 6). This is also true when we restrict our attention only to the 
second half of the experiment (49.0 versus 37.8; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.05, n1 = 6, 
n2 = 6).17 It is important to emphasize that the magnitude of the difference between the two 
treatments is quite substantial in size. The sequential contest generates almost 40% higher 
expenditure than the simultaneous contest, instead of the predicted 20% lower expenditure. As a 
result of this over-expenditure, the observed average payoff in the sequential contest is negative 
and lower than prediction (-6.0 versus 18.0). On the other hand, the average payoff in the 
simultaneous contest is positive and very close to prediction (9.6 versus 12.5). 
Finding 1: Average total expenditure is significantly higher in the sequential contest than 
in the simultaneous contest (evidence against Hypothesis 1). 
Next, we take a closer look at the individual battle behavior in both sequential and 
simultaneous contests. 
 
5.2. Sequential Contests 
One of our central predictions is that the sequential contest generates the New Hampshire 
Effect, so that the winner of battle 1 is more likely to win battle 2 and the overall contest 
(Hypothesis 2). For our parameters, the winner of battle 1 is predicted to win the overall contest 
                                                 
17 Mixed-effects panel regressions collaborate the results of the non-parametric statistical tests (see Table B2 in 
Appendix B). In estimating these regressions, we used total expenditure as the dependent variable and a treatment 
dummy-variable, a period trend, and a constant as the independent variables. Regressions based on Cameron et al. 
(2008) wild cluster approach produce similar results. 
16 
 
with probability 0.875. In the experiment, we find that the winner of battle 1 wins the overall 
contest with probability 0.83, and this qualitative result persist through all 20 periods of the 
experiment, as evident in Figure 3. It is important to note that a best of three coin‐toss model would 
also generate a probability of 0.75 that the winner of battle 1 wins the overall contest. However, 
both a binomial test of proportions and a conservative non-parametric test indicate that the 
observed probability of winning is significantly higher than the prediction from the coin‐toss 
model (0.83 versus 0.75; test of proportions, p-value < 0.01; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 
0.02, n = 6). Thus, consistent with the New Hampshire Effect, we find that the winner of the battle 
1 is more likely to win the overall contest. 
Another prediction emerging from the New Hampshire Effect entails that winning battle 1 
creates asymmetry, leading the winner of battle 1 to spend more in battle 2 than the loser of battle 
1. More specifically, for our parameters, theory predicts that the winner of battle 1 should spend 
14.1 in battle 2 and the loser of battle 1 should spend 4.7 in battle 2 (see Table 1). Consistent with 
this prediction, we find that the average expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 winner is significantly 
higher than the average expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 loser (27.0 versus 19.7; Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p-value = 0.02, n1 = 6, n2 = 6).18 
Finding 2: In the sequential contest, the winner of battle 1 wins battle 2 and the overall 
contest more often than the loser of battle 1 (evidence for Hypothesis 2). 
Although we find significant support for the New Hampshire Effect, we also find important 
deviations from the theory. First, relative to the theoretical benchmarks, we find over-expenditure 
in all battles. The expenditure in battle 1 is significantly higher than predicted (22.1 versus 16.4; 
                                                 
18 A mixed-effects panel regression collaborates the results of the non-parametric statistical tests (see Table B3 in 
Appendix B). In estimating this regression, we used a battle 2 expenditure as the dependent variable and a dummy-
variable for winning battle 1, a period trend, and a constant as the independent variables. A regression based on 
Cameron et al. (2008) wild cluster approach produces similar results. 
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Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.02, n = 6). The same is true for the expenditure in battle 2 
by battle 1 winner (27.0 versus 14.1; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.02, n = 6), the 
expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 loser (19.7 versus 4.7; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 
0.02, n = 6), and the expenditure in battle 3 (29.6 versus 25.0; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value 
= 0.04, n = 6).19 Our observation of over-expenditure in all three battles is inconsistent with the 
theoretical predictions of the model, but it can explain why the sequential contests generate much 
a higher total expenditure than the simultaneous contests (Finding 1).  
Second, contrary to the predictions, expenditure in battle 2 is greater than in battle 1. 
Specifically, the theory predicts that the expenditure of battle 1 winner should decrease from 16.4 
in battle 1 to 14.1 in battle 2. Instead, the data show that battle 1 winners do not decrease their 
battle 2 expenditure (25.1 versus 27.0; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.24, n = 6), with 
84% of expenditure in battle 2 being higher than the equilibrium prediction of 14.1, as shown in 
Figure 4. Similarly, contrary to the predicted decrease in expenditure from 16.4 in battle 1 to 4.7 
in battle 2, battle 1 losers also do not decrease their battle 2 expenditure (19.1 versus 19.7; 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.91, n = 6), with 81% of expenditure in battle 2 being higher 
than the equilibrium prediction of 4.7, as shown in Figure 4.  
Finally, aggressive play by both players explains why the sequential contest lasts longer 
than expected. Contrary to the theoretical prediction that the sequential contest should end in battle 
2 with probability 0.75, we find that on average the contest ends in battle 2 with probability 0.65.20 
However, there is some evidence of learning since the likelihood of battle 2 being the decisive one 
is increasing with the repetition of the experiment (see Figure 3). For example, in the first half of 
                                                 
19 The non-parametric statistical tests are also corroborated by mixed-effect panel regressions (see Table B4 in 
Appendix B). Regressions based on Cameron et al. (2008) wild cluster approach produce similar results. 
20 See Table B4 in Appendix B. 
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the experiment 60% of the contests conclude after two battles, and this proportion increased to 
68% in the second half. 
Finding 3: In the sequential contest, over-expenditure is observed in all three battles. 
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, both battle 1 winner and battle 1 loser do not decrease their 
expenditure in battle 2 relative to battle 1. As a result, the probability of contest ending in two 
battles is lower than predicted. 
Significant over-expenditure is consistent with previous findings of contest experiments 
(Dechenaux et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2017) and various explanations have been offered in the 
literature (Sheremeta, 2013, 2015).21 We will focus on two explanations: sunk cost and utility of 
winning. These factors are naturally linked to the multi-stage sequential contests and can explain 
the observed over-expenditure in these contests; but in addition they also offer an insight into the 
difference across sequential and simultaneous contests. 
 
5.2.1. Sunk Cost Fallacy 
The payoff maximization problem underlying the multi-battle sequential contest 
equilibrium regards the expenditure in previous battles as sunk cost, and therefore ignores them. 
However, the sequential nature of the contest can create an irrational regard for sunk cost, or in 
other words, subjects can fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy (Staw, 1976). Evidence from various 
behavioral studies find that cognitive dissonance can induce people who have sunk resources into 
an unprofitable activity to irrationally revise their beliefs about the profitability of an additional 
expenditure, in order to avoid the unpleasant acknowledgment that they made a mistake (Friedman 
                                                 
21 Explanations for over-expenditure in single-battle contests include non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 
2010a, 2010b; Cason et al., 2011, 2012), mistakes (Sheremeta, 2011), misperception of probabilities (Shupp et al., 
2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014), evolutionary bias (Mago et al., 2016), and impulsivity (Sheremeta, 2016). 
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et al., 2007; Baliga and Ely, 2011; Just and Wansink, 2011; Augenblick, 2016). In our experiment, 
subjects who get to battle 2 have already made some expenditure in battle 1. If the sunk cost 
hypothesis is true, it should entail that subjects who spend more resources in battle 1 are also more 
likely to spend more in battle 2 – to increase their chance of winning the prize and recoup some of 
their expenditure. Indeed, we find a positive and significant relationship between the expenditure 
in battle 2 and battle 1 (p-value < 0.01).22 However, this positive relationship also could arise 
because of the presence of a subset or “type” of subjects who tend to spend more in all battles of 
the sequential contest. Therefore, to provide direct empirical evidence for the sunk cost hypothesis 
in our experimental environment, we collected additional data from a modified version of the 
sequential contest. 
We ran 5 sessions of a modified version of the sequential contest at Chapman University. 
The 60 subjects who participated in these additional sessions faced rules that were essentially the 
same as in the original sequential contest, with the only difference that the subjects did not make 
any expenditure in battle 1 and the winner of that battle was determined randomly by a computer. 
This feature allows us to see how subjects behave in battle 2 without prior sunk cost expenditure. 
Our hypothesis is that if subjects fall prey to sunk cost fallacy then expenditure in the latter battles 
of the modified contests would be less than in the original sequential contest. Indeed, we find 
strong support for our hypothesis (and thereby, the sunk cost explanation). In battle 2, expenditure 
in the modified sequential contest is 25% lower than in the original sequential contest (18.7 versus 
23.3; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.06, n1 = 5, n2 = 6). This is also true when we separate 
our sample by battle 1 winner (22.1 versus 27.0; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.06, n1 = 5, 
n2 = 6) and battle 1 loser (15.2 versus 19.7; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.04, n1 = 5, n2 = 
                                                 
22 This conclusion comes from estimating a mixed-effect panel regression. 
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6).23 However, relative to the theoretical predictions, the expenditure in battle 2 is still significantly 
higher for battle 1 winner (22.1 versus 14.1; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.04, n = 5) and 
for battle 1 loser (15.2 versus 4.7; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.04, n = 5). 
Extending this sunk cost argument to battle 3, it follows that since subjects make lower 
expenditure in battle 2 we should also observe lower expenditure in battle 3 of the modified 
sequential contest. In support of this hypothesis, we find that battle 3 expenditure in the modified 
sequential contest is 36% lower than in the original sequential contest (21.5 versus 29.7; Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, p-value = 0.01, n1 = 5, n2 = 6).24 Moreover, in the modified sequential contest, the 
expenditure in battle 3 is not statistically different from the theoretical predictions (21.5 versus 
25.0; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.13, n = 5). 
Therefore, we find direct empirical evidence supporting the sunk cost explanation for 
significant over-expenditure in the sequential multi-battle contest. This irrational regard for sunk 
cost can also explain why the sequential contests generate higher total expenditure than the 
simultaneous contests (Finding 1). Although the number of battles is identical in both simultaneous 
and sequential contest, the temporal sequencing of the sequential contest results in a sunk cost 
fallacy while this effect is absent in the simultaneous contest. 
 
5.2.2. Utility of Winning 
Cox et al. (1988) were among the first to suggest the utility of winning as an explanation 
for overbidding in auctions, and Goeree et al. (2002) used an empirical strategy to identify the 
                                                 
23 The non-parametric statistical tests are also collaborated by mixed-effect panel regressions (see Table B5 in 
Appendix B). In estimating these regressions, we used a battle 2 expenditure as the dependent variable and a treatment 
dummy-variable, a period trend, and a constant as the independent variables. Regressions based on Cameron et al. 
(2008) wild cluster approach produce similar results. 
24 See Table B5 in Appendix B. 
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utility of winning. In a contest framework, Sheremeta (2010b) proposed a method of directly 
measuring the utility of winning in an incentive compatible way. Since then, numerous 
experimental studies have employed non-monetary utility of winning as an explanation for over-
expenditure in contests (Sheremeta, 2013, 2015; Cason et al., 2011, 2012; Price and Sheremeta, 
2011, 2015; Mago et al., 2016). 
We employ the non-monetary utility of winning to explain some patterns in our data that 
cannot be explained by the sunk cost fallacy. Specifically, in the sequential contest, we find that 
the reduced probability of the contest ending in battle 2 and the resulting over-expenditure is 
largely driven by the increased expenditure in battle 2, by both battle 1 winner and battle 1 loser 
(Finding 3). Since this increased expenditure is not grounded in standard equilibrium explanation 
and may not be completely accounted for by the sunk cost fallacy, we postulate that subjects may 
derive additional non-monetary utility from winning itself. 25 
Based on the assumption that subjects care only about their monetary prize, standard 
equilibrium theory predicts that battle 1 loser will suffer from a dramatic decrease in his 
continuation value for the next battle, and accordingly spend less in battle 2; given this, the winner 
of battle 1 will also reduce his expenditure in battle 2. However, if we incorporate winning as a 
component in the subject’s utility function, the decline in continuation value is not so dramatic for 
either players. Following similar theoretical models presented in Parco et al. (2005), Amaldoss 
and Rapoport (2009), and Sheremeta (2010b, 2013), suppose the non-monetary utility takes an 
additive form, i.e., in addition to the value of the prize 𝑣𝑣, individuals also have a non-monetary 
                                                 
25 As evidenced in the prior discussion, sunk cost fallacy cannot explain all the deviations from the theory. Even in 
the modified sessions, expenditure in battle 2 remains significantly higher relative to the theoretical predictions for 
both winner and loser of battle 1. Also, the sunk cost fallacy cannot explain the fact that battle 1 loser (who presumably 
spent less resources in battle 1, and should not be subject to sunk cost fallacy as much as battle 1 winner) does not 
give up in battle 2. 
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utility of winning 𝑤𝑤, where 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 𝑣𝑣. Then instead of (3), the updated expected payoff in battle 
3 becomes: 
𝐸𝐸′(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋3) = 𝑥𝑥3𝑥𝑥3+𝑦𝑦3 (𝑣𝑣 + 𝑤𝑤) − 𝑥𝑥3,            (7) 
Similarly, instead of (4), the updated expected payoffs in battle 2 become: 
𝐸𝐸′(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋2) = 𝑥𝑥2𝑥𝑥2+𝑦𝑦2 (𝑣𝑣 + 𝑤𝑤) + 𝑦𝑦2𝑥𝑥2+𝑦𝑦2 𝐸𝐸′∗(𝜋𝜋3) − 𝑥𝑥2 and 𝐸𝐸′(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌2) = 𝑦𝑦2𝑥𝑥2+𝑦𝑦2 (𝐸𝐸′∗(𝜋𝜋3) + 𝑤𝑤) − 𝑦𝑦2   (8) 
Finally, instead of (5), the updated payoff in battle 1 becomes: 
 𝐸𝐸′(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋1) = 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥1+𝑦𝑦1 (𝐸𝐸′∗(𝜋𝜋𝑋𝑋2) + 𝑤𝑤) + 𝑦𝑦1𝑥𝑥1+𝑦𝑦1 𝐸𝐸′∗(𝜋𝜋𝑌𝑌2)  − 𝑥𝑥1.          (9) 
Although we cannot obtain a closed form solution analytically, we can solve this model 
numerically. Figure 5 shows expenditures in the sequential contest in all three battles as a function 
of the utility of winning 𝑤𝑤, for 𝑤𝑤 ∈ [0,100]. It is clear that the utility of winning gives incentive 
to both players to engage in higher spending. Specifically, upon accounting for 𝑤𝑤, both winner 
and loser of battle 1 make higher than predicted expenditures in battle 2 for 𝑤𝑤 ∈ (0,100]; and 
despite this over-dissipation, the expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 winner is higher than by battle 
1 loser for 𝑤𝑤 ∈ [0,100). This predicted pattern of expenditure is consistent with our Finding 2.  
Furthermore, the utility of winning provides an equilibrium explanation for why the loser 
of battle 1 does not decrease his/her expenditure in battle 2 as much as predicted (Finding 3). From 
Figure 5 it is evident that as 𝑤𝑤 increases, the gap in expenditure in battle 2 by winner and loser of 
battle 1, and the corresponding New Hampshire Effect, decreases. In fact, when utility of winning 
is equal to prize of the contest (𝑣𝑣 = 𝑤𝑤 = 100) the equilibrium expenditure of the winner is same 
as that of the loser.  
Utility of winning may also provide insight into why expenditure is significantly higher in 
sequential contests compared to simultaneous contests (Finding 1). Both Parco et al. (2005) and 
Sheremeta (2010b) suggest that the utility of winning is increasing in the number of stages. 
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Although the number of battles is identical in both simultaneous and sequential contest, in the 
sequential contest subjects can receive non-monetary utility of winning up to two times (when 
each battle winner is announced) while in the simultaneous contest such utility is received only 
once (when the overall winner is announced). Figure 6 shows total expenditure in sequential and 
simultaneous contests as a function of the utility of winning 𝑤𝑤, for 𝑤𝑤 ∈ [0,100]. It is evident that 
the sequential contest generates higher total expenditure than the simultaneous contest for 𝑤𝑤 ∈[15,100] (i.e., higher than 15% of the prize value 𝑣𝑣 = 100). The lower bound for 𝑤𝑤 is fairly 
conservative, given the results of Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) and Price and Sheremeta (2010, 
2015), where 𝑤𝑤 is estimated to be around 50% of the prize value. 
 
5.3. Simultaneous Contests 
For the simultaneous contest, theory predicts that subjects allocate expenditure equally 
across all the three battles (Hypothesis 3). Our data reveals that although the average expenditure 
in all three battles is close to the predicted level of 12.5 (Table 2), none of the subjects who 
participated in the simultaneous contest employ a uniform expenditure strategy. Most subjects vary 
their expenditure between battles, with the difference from the mean expenditure across all three 
battles averaging at a steep 12.1. Figure 7 displays the average difference from the mean 
expenditure across all three battles in a given period. A lower magnitude of dispersion implies a 
more uniform expenditure strategy and obviously, in equilibrium, the magnitude of dispersion 
should be zero. We find that although there is some evidence that the dispersion of expenditure 
across the three battles decreases in the first five periods of the experiment; on the whole, the 
average difference in expenditure between battles remains positive and significant over the entire 
length of the experiment. 
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Figure 8 displays the distribution of expenditure within each battle over all 20 periods of 
the simultaneous contest. Two things stand out. First, despite the large variance, the overall 
distribution of expenditure is remarkably similar in the three battles indicating no preferential bias 
between battles.26 Second, subjects’ expenditures are distributed over the entire strategy space, 
which is clearly inconsistent with play at a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. While a large 
majority of the expenditure is centered close to the equilibrium prediction of 12.5, there is also 
substantial variation in expenditure.  
Finding 4: Subjects in the simultaneous contest do not employ a uniform expenditure 
strategy. There is substantial dispersion in expenditure both between-battles in a given period and 
within-battles over time. 
This dispersion in expenditure (both between and within battles) alludes to a strategy akin 
to “guerilla warfare.” To win the overall contest, a player needs to win a minimum of two battles. 
She does not derive any additional utility from winning all three battles. This suggests that players 
can randomly select and focus their expenditure on just two battles. We find that the average 
minimum expenditure in a battle is 7.7, almost half the prediction of 12.5. Indeed, 24% of time, 
expenditure in one of the battles is less than or equal to 1. Similarly, expenditure in the remaining 
two battles averages at 16.3, and exceeds the equilibrium prediction more 62% of the time. 
Although contrary to the theoretical prediction, focusing on the minimal set of battles which are 
sufficient for victory has an intuitive appeal and such behavior has been observed in other multi-
battle contest experiments (see the review by Sheremeta, 2017).27 
                                                 
26 That is, there is no allocation bias such as that observed in Colonel Blotto games (Chowdhury et al., 2013), where 
players who read and write from left to right horizontally in their native language tend to allocate greater expenditure 
to the battles on the left. 
27 It is important to emphasize, however, that the “guerilla warfare” strategy is not an equilibrium strategy. In fact, in 
the context of a lottery contest success function, the only equilibrium is to allocate resources uniformly across all 
battles (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Kovenock et al., 2010; Kovenock and Roberson, 2012). 
25 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we use a laboratory experiment to compare sequential and simultaneous 
contests, where candidates have to win the majority of battles in order to obtain a prize. Candidates 
influence the probability of winning a battle by their choice of expenditure in that battle. We find 
that, contrary to prediction, sequential contests generate significantly higher expenditure than 
simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-
expenditure in all three battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as two 
complementary explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence. 
Our findings have implications both for policy makers and social scientists. In particular, 
the finding that sequential contests induce higher expenditure (and thus more inefficiency) than 
simultaneous contests is both interesting and puzzling. Previous theoretical and empirical research 
on sequential and simultaneous voting provides mixed evidence in favor of sequential system 
(Morton and Williams, 1999, 2000; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006). Battaglini et al. (2007), for 
example, find that a sequential voting rule is more efficient but less equitable than simultaneous 
voting in some information environments. We show that, on the contrary, simultaneous contest 
dominates sequential contest because it generates substantially lower expenditure. Thus, we 
provide evidence that attempts such as ‘Frontloading’ and ‘Super Tuesday’ to make presidential 
nomination process more like the simultaneous contest may indeed lead to a more efficient and 
significantly less costly electoral process. Furthermore, our result that sunk costs result in higher 
expenditure in the sequential costs may have important implications for the organizational 
structure of the primaries. The choice of New Hampshire, which represent 0.4 percent of the U.S. 
population, as the first primary state may be an attempt to keep the overall campaign costs as small 
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as possible. Similarly, utility of winning may be one of the explanations why candidates with later 
finishes continue to seek the nomination. 
Our theoretical construct is a prototype model of a strategic multi-dimensional resource 
allocation game (Kovenock and Roberson, 2012). Although our experimental design is built 
around the theoretical model of Klumpp and Polborn (2006), who compare sequential and 
simultaneous multi-battle contests in the context of primary elections, our design can also be used 
to analyze problems in various fields such as military and systems defense (Hausken, 2008), 
advertising resource allocation (Friedman, 1958), and research and development portfolio 
selection (Clark and Konrad, 2008). 
Our experimental design considers the simplest setting of two symmetric players in a three-
battle contest. While our experimental framework captures some of the most salient features of 
sequential and simultaneous contests, we have set aside empirically relevant issues, such as 
candidate strength differences, state‐specific advantages, and endogenous donations, which limits 
the external validity of our results. Extending our design to account for these issues remains a 
promising avenue for future research. For instance, given the observed deviations from predictions, 
it would be interesting to study how behavior evolves in case of more battles and/or asymmetric 
players.  
27 
 
References 
Altmann, S., Falk, A. & Wibral, M. (2012). Promotions and incentives: The case of multistage 
elimination tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics, 30, 149-174. 
Amegashie, J.A., Cadsby, C.B., & Song, Y. (2007). Competitive burnout: Theory and 
experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 213-239. 
Arad, A. & Rubinstein, A. (2012). Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning in action: The case of the 
Colonel Blotto game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84, 571-585. 
Arad, A. (2012). The Tennis Coach problem: A game-theoretic and experimental study. The B.E. 
Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12, 10. 
Augenblick, N. (2016). The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions. Review of Economic Studies, 83, 
58-86.  
Avrahami, J., & Kareev, Y. (2009). Do the weak stand a chance? Distribution of resources in a 
competitive environment. Cognitive Science, 33, 940-950. 
Baik, K. & Lee, S. (2000).Two-stage rent-seeking contests with carryovers. Public Choice, 103, 
285-296. 
Baliga, S., & Ely, J.C. (2011). Mnemonomics: The sunk cost fallacy as a memory kludge. 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3, 35-67. 
Battaglini, M., Morton, R.B., & Palfrey, T.R. (2007). Efficiency, equity and timing of voting 
mechanisms. American Political Science Review, 101, 409-424. 
Borel, E. (1921). La theorie du jeu les equations integrales a noyau symetrique. Comptes Rendus 
del Academie. 173, 1304-1308; English translation by Savage, L. (1953). The theory of play 
and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels. Econometrica, 21, 97-100. 
Busch, A., & Mayer, W. (2004). The front-loading problem. In: Mayer, W. (Eds.), The making of 
the presidential candidate. Rowman and Littlefied Publishers, Inc, USA, 83-132. 
Callander, S. (2007). Bandwagons and momentum in sequential voting. Review of Economic 
Studies, 74, 653-684 
Cameron, A.C., Gelbach, J.B., & Miller, D.L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for inference 
with clustered errors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 414-427.  
Cason, T.N., Masters, W.A. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Winner-take-all and proportional-prize 
contests: Theory and experimental results. Working Paper. 
Cason, T.N., Sheremeta, R.M., & Zhang, J. (2012). Communication and efficiency in competitive 
coordination games. Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 26-43. 
Chowdhury, S.M., Kovenock, D. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). An experimental investigation of 
Colonel Blotto games. Economic Theory, 52, 833-861. 
Chowdhury, S.M., Sheremeta, R.M., Turocy, T.L. (2014). Overbidding and overspreading in rent-
seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. Games and Economic Behavior. 
87, 224-238. 
Clark, D.J., & Konrad, K.A. (2007). Asymmetric conflict weakest link against best shot. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 51, 457-469. 
Clark, D.J., & Konrad, K.A. (2008). Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D. 
Management Science, 54, 969-981. 
Cox, J.C., Smith, V.L., & Walker, J.M. (1988). Theory and individual behavior of first-price 
auctions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1, 61-99. 
Davis, D., & Reilly, R. (1998). Do too many cooks spoil the stew? An experimental Analysis of 
rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer. Public Choice, 95, 89-115. 
28 
 
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). A Survey of experimental research on 
contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 18, 609-669. 
Deck, C. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Fight or flight? Defending against sequential attacks in the 
Game of Siege. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, 1069-1088. 
Deck, C. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2016). Tug-of-war in the laboratory. Working Paper. 
Duffy, J., & Matros, A. (2015). Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: Some new results. 
Economics Letters, 134, 4-8. 
Feigenbaum, J.J., & Shelton, C.A. (2013). The vicious cycle: Fundraising and perceived viability 
in US presidential primaries. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8, 1-40. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178. 
Friedman, D., Pommerenke, K., Lukose, R., Milam, G. & Huberman, B. (2007) Searching for the 
sunk cost fallacy. Experimental Economics, 10, 79-104. 
Friedman, L. (1958). Game-theory models in the allocation of advertising expenditure. Operations 
Research, 6, 699-709. 
Fudenberg, D., Gilbert, R., Stiglitz, J., & Tirole, J. (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging and 
competition in patent races. European Economic Review, 22, 3-31. 
Gelder, A., & Kovenock, D. (2017). Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-
battle contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 444-455. 
Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A., & Palfrey, T.R. (2002). Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding 
in private-value auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 104, 247-272. 
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1985). Perfect equilibrium in a model of a race. Review of Economic 
Studies, 52, 193-209. 
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1987). Racing with uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies, 54, 1-21. 
Hausken, K. (2008). Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 186, 856-881. 
Höchtl, W., Kerschbamer, R., Stracke, R. & Sunde, U. (2015). Incentives vs. selection in 
promotion tournaments: Can a designer kill two birds with one stone? Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 36, 275-285. 
Holt, C.A. & Laury, S.K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 
92, 1644-1655. 
Holt, C.A., Kydd, A., Razzolini, L., & Sheremeta, R. (2016). The paradox of misaligned profiling 
theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60, 482-500. 
Hortala-Vallve, R. & Llorente-Saguer, A. (2010). A simple mechanism for resolving conflict. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 375-391. 
Just, D.R., & Wansink, B. (2011). The flat-rate pricing paradox: Conflicting effects of “all-you-
can-eat” buffet pricing. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 193-200. 
Klumpp, T., & Polborn, M.K. (2006). Primaries and the New Hampshire effect. Journal of Public 
Economics, 90, 1073-1114. 
Konrad, K.A., & Kovenock, D. (2009). Multi-battle contests. Games Economic Behavior, 66, 256-
274. 
Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2012). Conflicts with multiple battlefields. In Garfinkel, M.R., 
Skaperdas, S. (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict. New York: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 503-531. 
Kovenock, D., Roberson, B. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2010). The attack and defense of weakest-link 
networks. Working Paper. 
29 
 
Kvasov, D. (2007). Contests with limited resources. Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 738-748. 
Leininger, W. (1991). Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: the 
role of research budgets. Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 146-172. 
Mago, S.D. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2017). Multi-battle contests: An experimental study. Southern 
Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
Mago, S.D., Savikhin, A.C. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Facing your opponents: Social 
identification and information feedback in contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60, 459-
481. 
Mago, S.D., Sheremeta, R.M. & Yates, A. (2013). Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic 
versus psychological momentum. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 287-
296. 
Mayer, W. (2004). The basic dynamics of contemporary nomination process. In: Mayer, W. (Eds.), 
The making of the presidential candidate. Rowman and Littlefied Publishers, Inc, USA, 83-
132. 
McKee, M. (1989). Intra-experimental income effects and risk aversion. Economic Letters, 30, 
109-115. 
Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., Sefton, M., & Turocy, T.L. (2016). Majoritarian Blotto contests 
with asymmetric battlefields: An experiment on Apex games. Economic Theory, 61, 55-89. 
Morton, R.B., & Williams, K.C. (1999). Information asymmetries and simultaneous versus 
sequential voting. American Political Science Review, 93, 51-67. 
Morton, R.B., & Williams, K.C. (2000). Learning by voting: Sequential choices in presidential 
primaries and other elections. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Parco J., Rapoport A., & Amaldoss W. (2005). Two-stage contests with budget constraints: An 
experimental study. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 49, 320-338. 
Price, C.R. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Endowment effects in contests. Economics Letters, 111, 
217-219. 
Price, C.R. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Endowment origin, demographic effects and individual 
preferences in contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 24, 597-619. 
Roberson, B. (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory, 29, 1-24. 
Ryvkin, D. (2011). Fatigue in dynamic tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy, 20, 1011-1041. 
Schmitt, P., Shupp, R. Swope, K., & Cadigan, J. (2004). Multi-period rent-seeking contests with 
carryover: Theory and experimental evidence. Economics of Governance, 10, 247-259. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2010a). Expenditures and information disclosure in two-stage political contests. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 771-798. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2010b). Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 68, 731-747. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Contest design: An experimental investigation. Economic Inquiry, 49, 
573-590. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 27, 491-514. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Behavioral dimensions of contests. In Congleton, R.D., Hillman, A.L., 
(Eds.), Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 150-
164. 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2016). Impulsive behavior in competition: Testing theories of overbidding in 
rent-seeking contests. Working Paper. 
30 
 
Sheremeta, R.M. (2017). Experimental research on contests. Working Paper. 
Sheremeta, R.M., & Zhang, J. (2010). Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? 
Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175-197. 
Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R.M., Schmidt, D., & Walker, J. (2013). Resource allocation contests: 
Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 257-267. 
Snyder, J. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. Econometrica, 57, 630-
660. 
Staw, B.M. (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a chosen 
course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16, 27-44.  
Szentes, B., & Rosenthal, R.W. (2003). Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority 
auction games. Games and Economic Behavior, 45, 278-295. 
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon 
Tullock, (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, pp. 97-112. 
Zizzo, D.J. (2002). Racing with uncertainty: A patent race experiment. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 20, 877-902. 
 
  
31 
 
Table 1: Equilibrium Predictions in Sequential and Simultaneous Contests 
Treatments Sequential Simultaneous 
Final prize, v  100 100 
Number of battles, n 3 3 
 Equilibrium  Equilibrium 
Expenditure in battle 1 16.4 12.5 
Expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 winner 14.1 12.5 
Expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 loser 4.7 - 
Expenditure in battle 3 25.0 12.5 
Probability of contest ending in battle 2 0.75 - 
Expected total expenditure 32.0 37.5 
Expected payoff 18.0 12.5 
 
 
Table 2: Average Statistics 
Treatments Sequential Simultaneous 
Final prize, v  100 100 
Number of battles, n  3 3 
 Equilibrium Actual Equilibrium Actual 
Expenditure in battle 1 16.4 22.1 (13.4) 12.5 13.3 (10.2) 
Expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 winner 14.1 27.0 (14.8) 12.5 13.8 (9.9) 
Expenditure in battle 2 by battle 1 loser 4.7 19.7 (15.9) - - 
Expenditure in battle 3 by battle 2 winner 25.0 29.6 (15.9) 12.5 13.2 (10.1) 
Expenditure in battle 3 by battle 2 loser 25.0 29.7 (16.1) - - 
Probability of contest ending in battle 2 0.75 0.64 (0.47) - - 
Average total expenditure 32.0 56.0 (33.3) 37.5 40.3 (23.9) 
Average payoff  18.0 -6.0 (53.1) 12.5 9.6 (49.5) 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
  
32 
 
Figure 1: Average Expenditure over 20 Periods in the Sequential Contest 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Expenditure over 20 Periods in the Simultaneous Contest 
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Figure 3: Probability of Ending and Winning the Sequential Contest 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Expenditure in the Sequential Contest 
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Figure 5: Expenditure in the Sequential Contest as a Function of the Utility of Winning  
   
 
Figure 6: Total Expenditure in Sequential and Simultaneous Contests as a Function of the 
Utility of Winning  
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Figure 7: Average Difference from the Mean Expenditure across Three Battles in the 
Simultaneous Contest 
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of Expenditure in the Simultaneous Contest 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication): Instructions 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have provided 
funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you 
can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in part 1 of the experiment is U.S. 
Dollars. The currency used in part 2 of the experiment is francs. These francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a 
rate of _25_ francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes your show-up 
fee of $7.00). Your earnings from both part 1 and part 2 of the experiment will be incorporated into your participation 
fee. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. There are 12 participants in today’s 
experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim 
out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How much 
you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not designed 
to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really 
would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that 
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but only one line will be randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally 
likely to be selected, and you do not know which line will be selected when you make your choices. Hence you should 
pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly 
drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going 
to be selected for payment. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, you 
will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings in the 
case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage 
now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in the 
line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number shows 
up in the right column you earn $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, we ask you that you input all your 15 decisions into the 
computer. The actual earnings for this part will be determined at the end of part 2, and will be independent of part 2 
earnings. 
 
Decisi
on no. Option A 
Option 
B 
Please choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3 never $0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage $0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
3 $1 $3 if 1 or 2 $0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
4 $1 $3 if 1,2,3 $0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
5 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4, $0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 6 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5 $0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
7 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6 $0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
8 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
9 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
10 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 11 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
12 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 $3 if 1,2, 
 
$0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
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Instructions for the Simultaneous Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
 The second part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. The 12 participants in today’s 
experiment will be randomly re-matched every period into 6 groups with 2 participants in each group. Therefore, the 
specific person who is the other participant in your group will change randomly after each period. The group 
assignment is anonymous, so you will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to your group 
Each period you and the other participant in your group will simultaneously make bids (any number, 
including 0.1 decimal points) in three boxes. Your bid in each box cannot exceed 100 francs. The more you bid, the 
more likely you are to win a particular box. This will be explained in more detail later. The participant who wins at 
least two boxes receives the reward of 100 francs. Your total earnings depend on whether you receive the reward or 
not and how many francs you spent on bidding. An example of your decision screen is shown below: 
 
  
CHANCE OF WINNING A BOX 
The more you bid in a particular box, the more likely you are to win that box. The more the other participant 
bids in the same box, the less likely you are to win that box. Specifically, for each franc you bid in a particular box 
you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the 
tickets purchased by you and the other participant in the group. The owner of the drawn ticket wins. Thus, your chance 
of winning a particular box is given by the number of francs you bid in that box divided by the number of francs you 
and the other participant bid in that box. 
Your chance of 
winning a box  = 
Your Bid in That Box 
Your Bid in That Box + The Other Participant’s Bid in That Box 
In case both participants bid zero in the same box, the computer determines randomly who wins that box. 
Example: This is an example to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw of lottery tickets. Suppose, 
participant 1 bids 10 francs in box 1 and participant 2 bids 20 francs in box 1. Therefore, the computer assigns 10 
lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery 
ticket out of 30 tickets (10 + 20 = 30). As you can see, participant 2 has higher chance, 0.67 = 20/30, while participant 
1 has lower chance, 0.33 = 10/30, of winning box 1. 
In the sheet attached to these instructions, you will find a probability table. This table will give you some 
idea of how your bid and the other participant’s bid affect your chance of winning. For instance, suppose you bid 50 
francs and the other participant bid 30 francs then your chance of winning the box is 0.63. Note that as stated before, 
your chance of winning increases as your bid increases relative to the other participant’s bid. So if you bid 70 francs 
and the other participant is still bidding 30 francs, your chance of winning increases to 0.70. To assist you with 
calculation of more precise numbers, we will provide you with the Excel calculator. You may use the calculator to 
find the chance of winning for any combination of your bid and the other participant’s bid. We will have a few practice 
rounds with the Excel calculator before the start of the experiment. 
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YOUR EARNINGS 
 Your earnings depend on whether you receive the reward or not and how many francs you spent on bidding. 
The participant who wins at least two boxes receives the reward of 100 francs. Regardless of who receives the 
reward, both participants will have to pay their bids in each box. Thus, the period earnings will be calculated in the 
following way: 
Earnings of the participant who won at least two boxes= 100 - (bid in box 1) - (bid in box 2) - (bid in box 3)  
Earnings of the participant who won less than two boxes = 0 - (bid in box 1) - (bid in box 2) - (bid in box 3) 
   
END OF THE PERIOD 
After both participants make their box bids, the computer will make a random draw for each box separately 
and independently. The random draws made by the computer will decide which boxes you win. The computer will 
calculate your period earnings based on whether you received the reward or not and how many francs you spent on 
bidding in each box. Both participants will observe the outcome of the period – your bid in each box, other participant’s 
bids in each box, winner of each box, and your earnings from that period, as shown below. Once the outcome screen 
is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate 
heading. You will be randomly re-matched with a different participant at the start of the next period. 
 
 
END OF THE EXPERIMENT 
At the end of the experiment we will use the bingo cage to randomly select 2 out of 20 periods for actual 
payment. Depending on the outcome in a given period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. You will 
sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of 
your personal record sheet. Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 500 francs). 
If your earnings from this part of the experiment are positive, we will add them to your participation fee. If your 
earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. 
  
Instructions for the Sequential Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
 The second part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. The 12 participants in today’s 
experiment will be randomly re-matched every period into 6 groups with 2 participants in each group. Therefore, the 
specific person who is the other participant in your group will change randomly after each period. The group 
assignment is anonymous, so you will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to your group 
Each period consists of a maximum of three rounds. The period ends when one of the participants wins two 
of the three rounds ("best of three"). Thus, each period will consist of either two or three rounds. In each round, you 
and the other participant in your group will simultaneously make a bid (any number, including 0.1 decimal points). 
Your bid in each round cannot exceed 100 francs. The more you bid, the more likely you are to win a particular round. 
This will be explained in more detail later. The participant who is first to win two rounds receives the reward of 100 
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francs. Your earnings depend on whether you receive the reward or not and how many francs you spent on bidding. 
An example of your decision screen is shown below: 
 
 
CHANCE OF WINNING A ROUND 
The more you bid in a particular round, the more likely you are to win that round. The more the other 
participant bids in the same round, the less likely you are to win that round. Specifically, for each franc you bid you 
will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each round the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets 
purchased by you and the other participant in the group. The owner of the drawn ticket wins. Thus, your chance of 
winning a round is given by the number of francs you bid in that round divided by the number of francs you and the 
other participant bid in that round. 
Your chance of 
winning a round  = 
Your Bid in That Round 
Your Bid in That Round + The Other Participant’s Bid in That Round 
In case both participants bid zero, the computer determines randomly who wins that round. 
Example: This is an example to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw of lottery tickets. Suppose, 
in a given round participant 1 bids 10 francs and participant 2 bids 20 francs. Therefore, the computer assigns 10 
lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery 
ticket out of 30 tickets (10 + 20 = 30). As you can see, participant 2 has higher chance, 0.67 = 20/30, while participant 
1 has lower chance, 0.33 = 10/30, of winning the round. 
In the sheet attached to these instructions, you will find a probability table. This table will give you some 
idea of how your bid and the other participant’s bid affect your chance of winning. For instance, suppose you bid 50 
francs and the other participant bid 30 francs then your chance of winning the round is 0.63. Note that as stated before, 
your chance of winning increases as your bid increases relative to the other participant’s bid. So if you bid 70 francs 
and the other participant is still bidding 30 francs, your chance of winning increases to 0.70. To assist you with 
calculation of more precise numbers, we will provide you with the Excel calculator. You may use the calculator to 
find the chance of winning for any combination of your bid and the other participant’s bid. We will have a few practice 
rounds with the Excel calculator before the start of the experiment. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
 Your earnings depend on whether you receive the reward or not and how many francs you spent on bidding 
in each round. The participant who is first to win two rounds receives the reward of 100 francs. Regardless of who 
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids in each round. One of the four payment scenarios is 
possible: 
(1) If the period lasted for only two rounds  
  (1a) Earnings of the participant who won both rounds are = 100 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) 
  (1b) Earnings of the participant who won neither rounds are = 0 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) 
(2) If the period lasted for three rounds  
  (2a) Earnings of the participant who won two rounds are = 100 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round) 
  (2b) Earnings of the participant who won one round are = 0 – (bid in round 1) – (bid in round 2) - (bid in round 3) 
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END OF THE ROUND 
After both participants make their round bids, the computer will make a random draw which will determine 
the winner of the round. Both participants will observe the outcome of the round – your bid, other participant’s bid 
and winner, as shown below. Then they make bids in another round. This continues until one of the participants in the 
group wins two rounds.  
 
 
END OF THE PERIOD 
The period ends when one of the participants in the group wins two rounds. At the end of the period, the 
computer will calculate your period earnings based on the number of rounds you won and how many francs you spent 
on bidding in each round. Your earnings from that period will be reported on the outcome screen as shown below. 
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet 
under the appropriate heading. You will be randomly re-matched with a different participant at the start of the next 
period. 
 
 
END OF THE EXPERIMENT 
At the end of the experiment we will use the bingo cage to randomly select 2 out of 20 periods for actual 
payment. Depending on the outcome in a given period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. You will 
sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of 
your personal record sheet. Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 500 francs). 
If your earnings from this part of the experiment are positive, we will add them to your participation fee. If your 
earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. 
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Appendix B (For Online Publication): Additional Tables 
 
Table B1: Mixed-Effects Panel Models (Theory) 
Treatment Sequential Simultaneous  
Dependent variable Total expenditure Total expenditure 
Period 32.33*** 8.34*** 
    [inverse period trend] (3.09) (2.32) 
Constant 50.21*** 38.88*** 
 (3.35) (2.70) 
Observations 1,440 1,440 
Hypothesis Constant = 32.0 Constant = 37.5 
p-value < 0.01 = 0.60 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The 
standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a mixed-effects 
error structure to account for session and individual subject effects. 
 
 
Table B2: Mixed-Effects Panel Models (Finding 1) 
Treatment Sequential and Simultaneous  
Sequential and 
Simultaneous 
Period 1-20 11-20 
Dependent variable Total expenditure Total expenditure 
Sequential 15.64*** 11.22** 
    [1 if sequential contest] (4.25) (4.54) 
Period 20.33*** 19.97 
    [inverse period trend] (1.94) (31.52) 
Constant 36.72*** 36.52*** 
 (3.03) (3.84) 
Observations 2,880 1,440 
Hypothesis Sequential = 0 Sequential = 0 
p-value < 0.01 = 0.02 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The standard 
errors are in parentheses. All models include a mixed-effects error structure 
to account for session and individual subject effects. 
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Table B3: Mixed-Effects Panel Models (Finding 2) 
Treatment Sequential 
Dependent variable Expenditure in battle 2 
Win 5.16*** 
    [1 if the winner of battle 1] (0.70) 
Period 13.37*** 
    [inverse period trend] (1.52) 
Constant 18.39*** 
 (1.66) 
Observations 2,880 
Hypothesis Win = 0 
p-value < 0.01 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. The standard errors are in parentheses. All models 
include a mixed-effects error structure to account for session 
and individual subject effects. 
 
 
Table B4: Mixed-Effects Panel Models (Finding 3) 
Treatment Sequential Sequential Sequential Sequential Sequential 
Dependent variable Expenditure in battle 1 
Expenditure 
in battle 2 
(battle 1 winner) 
Expenditure 
in battle 2 
(battle 1 loser) 
Expenditure 
in battle 3 End in battle 2 
Period 10.30*** 10.33*** 15.44*** 7.32*** -0.16*** 
    [inverse period trend] (1.09) (1.98) (1.98) (2.40) (0.06) 
Constant 20.29*** 24.46*** 18.22*** 28.51*** 0.67*** 
 (1.18) (1.70) (2.12) (1.99) (0.03) 
Observations 1440 720 720 510  
Hypothesis Constant = 16.4 Constant = 14.1 Constant = 4.7 Constant = 25.0 Constant = 0.75 
p-value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 = 0.07 = 0.02 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are in parentheses. All models 
include a mixed-effects error structure to account for session and individual subject effects. 
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Table B5: Mixed-Effects Panel Models (Sunk Cost) 
Treatment Sequential Sequential Sequential Sequential 
Dependent variable Expenditure in battle 1 
Expenditure 
in battle 2 
(battle 1 winner) 
Expenditure 
in battle 2 
(battle 1 loser) 
Expenditure 
in battle 3 
Sunk -4.66** -3.85* -6.01** -8.02*** 
    [1 if sunk treatment] (1.92) (2.32) (2.38) (2.65) 
Period 8.54*** 5.94*** 10.83*** 5.33*** 
    [inverse period trend] (1.05) (1.29) (1.33) (1.60) 
Constant 21.84*** 25.24*** 19.06*** 28.92*** 
 (1.31) (1.58) (1.62) (1.82) 
Observations 2640 1320 1320 960 
Hypothesis Sunk = 0 Sunk = 0 Sunk = 0 Sunk = 0 
p-value = 0.02 = 0.09 = 0.02 < 0.01 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. All models include a mixed-effects error structure to account for session and 
individual subject effects. 
 
 
